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Intentions, including their temporal properties and semantic content, are receiving
increased attention, and neuroscientific studies in humans vary with respect to the topogra-
phy of intention-related neural responses.This may reflect the fact that the kind of intentions
investigated in one study may not be exactly the same kind investigated in the other. Fine-
grained intention taxonomies developed in the philosophy of mind may be useful to identify
the neural correlates of well-defined types of intentions, as well as to disentangle them
from other related mental states, such as mere urges to perform an action. Intention-related
neural signals may be exploited by brain-machine interfaces (BMIs) that are currently being
developed to restore speech and motor control in paralyzed patients. Such BMI devices
record the brain activity of the agent, interpret (“decode”) the agent’s intended action,
and send the corresponding execution command to an artificial effector system, e.g., a
computer cursor or a robotic arm. In the present paper, we evaluate the potential of inten-
tion concepts from philosophy of mind to improve the performance and safety of BMIs
based on higher-order, intention-related control signals.To this end, we address the distinc-
tion between future-, present-directed, and motor intentions, as well as the organization
of intentions in time, specifically to what extent it is sequential or hierarchical. This has
consequences as to whether these different types of intentions can be expected to occur
simultaneously or not. We further illustrate how it may be useful or even necessary to
distinguish types of intentions exposited in philosophy, including yes- vs. no-intentions
and oblique vs. direct intentions, to accurately decode the agent’s intentions from neural
signals in practical BMI applications.
Keywords: BMI, BCI, action intention, intentional, philosophy of mind
INTRODUCTION
Intentions lie at the heart of human goal-directed behavior and
have been debated for centuries in the philosophy of mind. Such
fundamental issues have been discussed as the role of ratio-
nal thought in intention formation (Bentham, 1781; Kant, 1785;
Wittgenstein, 1953; Davidson, 1963; Kiverstein, 2006; Mele, 2007),
and the temporal dynamics in and across distinct stages or kinds
of intending (Searle, 1983; Pacherie, 2006). Various definitions of
intention have been given, and a number of classifications have
been proposed.
Broadly speaking, intention can be conceived of as a mental
state in some way linked to phenomena such as decision, agency,
desire, and belief (e.g., Anscombe, 1963; Goldman, 1970; Bratman,
1987). It is widely, though not universally, assumed that intention
is causal to intentional action (Davidson, 1963). Theories differ
with respect to the question whether intentions count as distinctive
mental states (the non-reductive approach) or not (the reductive
approach), see Pacherie (2002) for a review and Setiya (2007) and
Bratman (2009) for a recent discussion. The exact nature and def-
inition of intention are thus a matter of debate. Here we proceed
from the influential definition of intention proposed by Bratman
(1987). It relies on a superordinate category of “pro-attitudes,”
which “play a motivational role” (1987, p. 15) in action. According
to Bratman (1987), intentions and desires are distinctive mental
states that fall into this category. A fundamental difference between
the two is that intentions are “conduct-controlling” (1987, p. 16),
whereas desires are “merely potential influencers of action” (1987,
p. 16).
Owing to the advancements in neural-recording methodology
over the last 50 years, various topographic, temporal, and seman-
tic (content) manifestations of intentions in the human brain have
been researched (Libet et al., 1983; Lau et al., 2004; Brass and Hag-
gard, 2007, 2008; Haynes et al., 2007; Krieghoff et al., 2009; Bara
et al., 2011) and are receiving further attention in cognitive neu-
roscience. The phenomenology and neurobiology of intentions
are important to study for several reasons. A better understanding
of causes and prerequisites for volitional behavior may aid objec-
tive evaluation of a person’s actions in ethical and legal contexts
(Haggard, 2008; Schleim, 2008). Furthermore, such knowledge
may help to treat patients with intention-related disorders, such
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as anarchic hand and Tourette’s syndromes (Haggard and Clark,
2003; Pacherie, 2007; Eddy et al., 2010; Edwards et al., 2011).
Conceptual input from the philosophy of intentions to
other disciplines has previously proven useful. The belief-desire-
intention model by Bratman (1987), for instance, was employed in
computer science to develop the belief–desire–intention software
model for programming intelligent agents (Rao and Georgeff,
1991). Similarly, philosophy may provide valuable input to the
neuroscience of volitional action (Haggard, 2005; Mele, 2008;
Pacherie and Haggard, 2010; Pacherie, 2011), and first attempts
have recently been made to integrate philosophically-informed
intention concepts into human neuroscience (Bara et al., 2011).
Here, we propose that intention concepts from the philosophy
of mind may be also usefully adopted by the emerging field of
brain-machine interfacing (BMI) research and technology. In par-
ticular, we argue that intention concepts are important for BMIs
utilizing higher-order intention-related brain activity, in contrast
to BMIs that are based solely on inference of low-level movement
parameters. The also widespread P300 BMI approaches as well as
those based on learned self-regulation of brain signals remain out-
side the scope of this article. Recent reviews on these topics can
be found in Fazel-Rezai et al. (2012) and Wolpaw et al. (2002),
respectively.
The structure of this article is as follows. In Section “Insights
into Intentions from Cognitive Neuroscience,” we review cur-
rent neuroscientific literature on intentions, and outline the
core areas involved in intention-related processing in humans.
In Section “Current Approaches to Brain-machine Interfacing,”
we address the basic principles that are currently employed in
BMI-based restoration of motor and communication functions.
In Section “Philosophical Taxonomies of Intentions and their
Relevance to BMI,” we summarize some influential philosoph-
ical notions and taxonomies of intentions, and illustrate their
potential relevance for neuroscientific research in general and
in particular for BMI. Finally, we draw conclusions and pro-
vide an outlook for future studies in Section “Conclusions and
Outlook.”
INSIGHTS INTO INTENTIONS FROM COGNITIVE
NEUROSCIENCE
Interest in intention-related brain signals has grown in neuro-
science over the last several decades. In their early electroen-
cephalography (EEG) readiness-potential study, Libet et al. (1983)
reported that cerebral activity before initiation of self-paced move-
ments precedes the conscious intention to move over several
100 ms. The observed temporal differences led these authors to
conclude that initiation of voluntary actions can begin uncon-
sciously, and it is only some time later that we become aware of an
intention to move. Although the reported findings and their inter-
pretation were highly controversial (e.g., Keller and Heckhausen,
1990; Snyder et al., 1997; Haggard and Eimer, 1999), the article by
Libet et al. (1983) contributed to the development of a vivid dis-
cussion about the nature of human free will, agency and voluntary
movement, and was followed by a large amount of experimental
studies and opinion articles concerning the neural correlates of
intentional action. Consecutive research identified a widespread
distribution of neural locations in the frontal, parietal, and even
temporal lobes (Figure 1), arranged in extended cortical networks
for intention-related processing (Haggard, 2008).
One cortical location that has been repeatedly activated in
studies on intention-related processing is the posterior parietal
cortex (PPC), in particular its inferior part (Figure 1). Initial
evidence for the contribution of this region to intentional con-
trol comes from single-cell recordings in monkeys. Specifically,
the parietal reach region (PRR) and the lateral intraparietal area
(LIP) have been shown to exhibit effector-specific neuronal activ-
ity in delayed saccadic and reaching tasks (Andersen and Buneo,
2002; Quian Quiroga et al., 2006; Cui and Andersen, 2007; Ander-
sen and Cui, 2009), suggesting that the PPC can convey neuronal
information about what the animal intends to do (Snyder et al.,
1997). In humans, involvement of parietal regions in intention-
related processing was observed using electrical stimulation, which
elicited a reported “urge to move” without consecutive execution
(Assal et al., 2007; Desmurget et al., 2009), and in lesion stud-
ies showing that awareness of an intention to move is abnormal in
FIGURE 1 | An overview of cortical responses reported in recent
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and positron
emission tomography (PET) studies that explicitly aimed at
investigating intentions in healthy subjects. Peaks are plotted on a
standard brain from SPM8 on (A) the left and (B) right hemisphere.
The approximate locations of the prefrontal and the inferior parietal
cortex are indicated in yellow and blue, respectively. Reported
intention-related peaks in both hemispheres exhibit a widespread
spatial distribution across the frontal, parietal, occipital, and temporal
lobes.
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patients with damage to the parietal cortex (Sirigu et al., 2004; Assal
et al., 2007). Parietal contributions to intention encoding were
also confirmed by a number of functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) studies. In prospective memory tasks, both lateral
and medial parietal regions showed increased blood-oxygen-level
dependent (BOLD) responses that stretched from the precuneus
into the anterior and posterior cingulate cortices, the intrapari-
etal sulcus, and inferior parietal regions (Burgess et al., 2001; den
Ouden et al., 2005; Eschen et al., 2007; Haynes et al., 2007; Soon
et al., 2008; Gilbert, 2011; Benoit et al., 2012; Momennejad and
Haynes, 2012). Investigations of non-delayed self-initiated move-
ments reported similar neural responses in the inferior parietal
lobe (Ball et al., 1999; Farrer et al., 2008; Krieghoff et al., 2009), in
the intraparietal sulcus (Lau et al., 2004; Gallivan et al., 2011a,b),
and in the anterior cingulate cortex (Cunnington et al., 2006;
Mueller et al., 2007; Krieghoff et al., 2009), as opposed to externally
triggered movements, which elicit no, or only attenuated activa-
tions in these regions (Jahanshahi et al., 1995; Jenkins et al., 2000;
Mueller et al., 2007; Hoffstaedter et al., 2012).
In addition to parts of the parietal cortex, the prefrontal cor-
tex (PFC, Figure 1) has been activated in many intention-related
studies. Delayed intention paradigms revealed lateral and medial
PFC responses, mostly in rostral prefrontal areas (Burgess et al.,
2001; den Ouden et al., 2005; Simons et al., 2006; Poppenk et al.,
2010; Gilbert, 2011; Benoit et al., 2012), whereas non-delayed
intention experiments showed activity in the dorsal medial and
lateral prefrontal regions (Lau et al., 2004; Cunnington et al., 2006;
Rushworth, 2008; Gallivan et al., 2011a,b; Rosenberg-Katz et al.,
2012). The frontopolar cortex (BA10) was suggested to represent
a gateway mechanism for orienting attention toward external and
internal stimuli, and to play a critical role in the encoding and
storage of future intentions (den Ouden et al., 2005; Haynes et al.,
2007; Soon et al., 2008; Uretzky and Gilboa, 2010). In accordance
with the latter, clinical evidence shows that lesions in this area lead
to the impaired ability to keep future intentions in mind for later
execution (Burgess et al., 2001).
Intention-related information is also thought to be present in
higher-order motor areas, including the supplementary motor area
(SMA; Eccles, 1982; Fried et al., 1991, 2011; Jahanshahi et al., 1995;
Ball et al., 1999; Jenkins et al., 2000; Lau et al., 2004; Soon et al.,
2008; Hoffstaedter et al., 2012; Momennejad and Haynes, 2012),
the pre-SMA (Lau et al., 2004, 2006; Cunnington et al., 2006;
Mueller et al., 2007; Nachev et al., 2007), and in the dorsal and
ventral premotor regions (Cunnington et al., 2006; Pesaran et al.,
2006; Eschen et al., 2007; Gallivan et al., 2011a,b; Hoffstaedter et al.,
2012). Since activity in the SMA and the pre-SMA typically occurs
early and precedes movement execution (Fried et al., 2011), and
considering that activation in the pre-SMA has been observed in
relation to own intentions as opposed to own movements (Lau
et al., 2004), these areas may contribute to intentional processes
during preparation for action (Passingham et al., 2010).
Finally, the anterior insular cortex has been co-activated with
several aforementioned areas in studies on intention encoding in
the human brain (Jahanshahi et al., 1995; Mueller et al., 2007;
Krieghoff et al., 2009; Hoffstaedter et al., 2012). Insular activation
has been proposed to subserve evaluation of possible consequences
of intentional actions (Brass and Haggard, 2010).
In addition to these core areas, intention-related activity has
been reported in many other brain regions with a widespread
distribution as shown in Figure 1, which presents an overview
of cortical activation foci reported by recent neuroimaging stud-
ies that explicitly aimed at investigating intentions in healthy
subjects. Using these criteria, we identified 22 studies (Burgess
et al., 2001; Lau et al., 2004, 2006; den Ouden et al., 2005; Cun-
nington et al., 2006; Simons et al., 2006; Eschen et al., 2007;
Haynes et al., 2007; Mueller et al., 2007; Farrer et al., 2008; Soon
et al., 2008; Krieghoff et al., 2009; Poppenk et al., 2010; Gilbert,
2011; Hashimoto et al., 2011; Okuda et al., 2011; Benoit et al.,
2012; Gilbert et al., 2012; Hoffstaedter et al., 2012; Momennejad
and Haynes, 2012; Rosenberg-Katz et al., 2012) reporting a total
amount of 303 cortical and subcortical intention-related peaks.
We performed an activation likelihood estimate analysis (ALE;
as described in Mutschler et al.,2009) of these studies to statistically
detect brain regions with responses that occur red reproducibly.
This revealed only two clusters with significant ALE (p< 0.05,
FDR-corrected). Both of them were located in the SMA (assigned
to Brodmann area 6 with maxima at MNI coordinates −2; 16;
54 and −4; 14; 50, and with respective probabilities of anatom-
ical assignment of 40 and 50% (Eickhoff et al., 2005). There
may be several reasons why only these clusters were significant.
First, the number of studies satisfying our strict selection criteria
was limited. Future meta-analyses based on larger samples may
reveal additional foci of reproducible neural responses. Second, as
argued in Brass and Haggard (2008, p. 319), the spread of neural
activity seen in neuroscientific literature on intentions may be
because “intentional action has been treated as a unitary concept
within neuroscience, even though experimental studies may focus
on any of a number of different aspects of intentional action.”
Meta-analyses distinguishing different types and aspects of human
intention may be necessary to reveal more reproducible neural
responses. Applying the same idea to the field of BMI research, in
the following section we discuss to what extent it may be useful
or even necessary to integrate different types as well as temporal
and semantic aspects of intentions to develop safe and efficient
real-life BMI applications.
CURRENT APPROACHES TO BRAIN-MACHINE INTERFACING
Brain-machine interfaces allow humans to control technical
devices through direct recordings of brain activity. To this end,
the device – either intracranial (brain-implanted) or extracranial
(fixed on the person’s skull) – measures the brain activity of an
agent, interprets (“decodes”) the agent’s intended action,and sends
the corresponding execution command to an artificial effector sys-
tem, such as a computer cursor, a prosthetic limb, or a wheelchair
(Figure 2A). First clinical trials have demonstrated the success of
the BMI principle for restoration of movement (Hochberg et al.,
2006, 2012) and communication (Birbaumer et al., 1999; Guenther
et al., 2009) in paralyzed individuals.
Brain-machine interfacing approaches may be categorized by
the type of brain signal used (single-neuron activity, neural-
population signals, etc.) and the invasiveness of the recording
technique (Waldert et al., 2009). To assess the potential impor-
tance of intention concepts for practical BMI purposes, we shall
characterize BMIs according to (i) the type of neural activity“input
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FIGURE 2 |The working principle and current approaches of BMI. In
(A), BMI-based control of a prosthetic hand by using recordings of brain
activity is depicted. The projections from the motor cortex (1) constituting
the cortico-spinal pathways (2) may be disrupted, e.g., by spinal-cord
injury (3). Then, suitable electrodes (4) can be used to record persistent
motor-cortical activity, which is transmitted by a technical connection (5;
either wire-based or wireless) to a decoder (6) extracting control signals
for an external actuator (7). If the primary motor cortex is destroyed, such
as due to stroke, cognitive control signals may still be recorded from
alternative areas such as the prefrontal cortex (8). As summarized in (B),
neural control signals may thus range from low-level motor signals, such
as related to movement direction or velocity, to more high-level cognitive
signals related to abstract action goals, subjective preferences, and
intentions. Output signals may be used to restore movement (e.g., of an
external actuator) or communication. The input-output mapping can be
realized in a direct way, e.g., if right- and leftward movement-related
neural activity controls the respective right- and leftward movements of
an effector, the intention to grasp a cup is directly translated into the
corresponding grasping action, or the intention to say the word “hello” is
directly translated into speech. Indirect strategies would be, for example:
using imagined leg vs. tongue movements to control right- vs. leftward
movements of a robotic arm.
signal”used to decode information, (ii) the type of external output
that is generated, and (iii) the kind of mapping between input and
output (Figure 2B).
Regarding neural input, an important distinction can be made
between BMIs using “low-level” motor signals, such as changes
in neural activity related to movement direction or velocity,
and BMIs utilizing “higher-level,” cognitive signals. These may
relate to subjective preferences or abstract action goals (Musal-
lam et al., 2004). Between these extremes, there is a spectrum
of more or less abstract/cognitive control signals that have been
used, or are at least in principle usable, for BMI applications.
Such signals can reflect that action plans are represented at dif-
ferent levels of abstraction in the brain (Bonini et al., 2011).
Many current BMIs use low-level motor control signals recorded
from primary or secondary motor areas (Hochberg et al., 2006,
2012; Moritz et al., 2008; Pistohl et al., 2012). BMIs based on
this approach, however, still have much room for improvement
in terms of decoding accuracy, especially in complex motor
tasks. These and other challenges of present BMI technology are
addressed further in a recent review by Schalk and Leuthardt
(2011).
Cognitive signals may help to make BMI control more accu-
rate. Based on the decoded abstract goals or intentions, intelligent
autonomous external devices can perform lower-level computa-
tions, such as trajectories, that are necessary to achieve movement
goals (Musallam et al., 2004). This approach may serve to lower
bandwidth requirements for BMIs. Furthermore, if the brain
structures that allow decoding movement-related signals (e.g.,
the primary motor cortex) are dysfunctional due to pathological
processes, cognitive neural control signals, such as action goal-
and intention-related activity from higher-order brain regions
including premotor, posterior parietal, and PFC, may be used to
substitute.
On the output side, the information decoded from either low-
or high-level signals may be harnessed to generate movement (of
a screen cursor, robotic arm, wheelchair, or even of a patient’s own
limbs via electrical stimulation of the muscles) or communication
signals (as ringing an alarm bell, controlling a spelling device for
writing, or synthesizing acoustic speech). Again, there are interme-
diate cases, such as if signals related to attempted right- and left-
hand movement (a motor signal) were used to select a part of the
alphabet or a letter in a spelling device (a communication output).
Different strategies may be used to map the input (brain) sig-
nal to the (externally-directed) output signal. We refer to those
that aim to restore movement or speech functions with neural
signals underlying the same function as “direct.” For instance,
a direct motor BMI would use brain signals related to left- vs.
rightward movements to generate left- vs. rightward movements
of an effector (Leuthardt et al., 2006; Milekovic et al., 2012). A
direct speech BMI may use neural signals related to the respec-
tive phoneme (Blakely et al., 2008; Guenther et al., 2009; Pei et al.,
2011), word (Kellis et al., 2010), semantic content (Wang et al.,
2011), and context-dependent style (Derix et al., 2012) to gener-
ate matching speech output. Thus, neural activity related to the
intended word “hello” would be decoded to spell “hello” in the
BMI output (Kellis et al., 2010). In contrast, indirect approaches
rely on neural input from tasks or modalities not directly related to
output. For example, imagined leg vs. tongue movements may be
used to control right- vs. leftward movements of a robotic arm. On
this principle, Leuthardt et al. (2011) recently achieved BMI-based
one-dimensional motor control using input signals related to pro-
duction of overt and imagined phonemes. Indirect approaches
have been widely used in non-invasive EEG-based BMI studies,
since it is possible to select arbitrary tasks inducing highly dis-
tinctive global topographic EEG patterns, which can be robustly
classified for BMI control.
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The importance of intention-related brain signals and the
potential role of intention concepts may vary depending on the
BMI approach. A BMI based on low-level motor control signals
may, at least to a certain extent, work without any such high-level
information as intention-related signals. For approaches which do
tap into intention-related processes in the brain, however, it may be
useful or even necessary to take well-informed intention concepts
into account, especially given a direct framework, i.e., if intentions
are to be directly translated into the intended action.
Risks due to misinterpretation of neural control signals would
be greatest for BMIs with effectors such as robotic arms or wheel-
chairs. In such applications, decoding of higher-order information
with respect to the final goal of action as a whole may be a useful
safety precaution, even if they primarily rely on low-level motor
signals. In summary, intention concepts appear most relevant for
direct BMIs using cognitive neural control signals, with both move-
ment and speech output, but intention-related information may
also constitute an auxiliary information channel for other types of
BMIs.
PHILOSOPHICAL TAXONOMIES OF INTENTIONS AND THEIR
RELEVANCE TO BMI
A properly designed intention-based BMI device should be able
to clearly distinguish between different types of intentions. For
instance, a patient using a BMI to steer a wheelchair may intend to
turn right in a few seconds, right now, or next Wednesday, and the
wheelchair must be sensitive to this temporal difference. At first
glance, this distinction seems fairly trivial. Yet the question arises:
How many different kinds of intentions can be identified by their
temporal characteristics? And how are different types of inten-
tions organized in time, that is, what are their individual dynamics,
mutual transitions, and interactions? A number of intention theo-
ries (Searle, 1983; Brand, 1984; Bratman, 1987; Pacherie, 2006)
have addressed the issue of timing and elaborated on various
aspects of future- vs. present-oriented intentions.
Among other questions related to rational action, Bratman
(1987) addressed differences between future- and present-directed
intentions. According to his conceptual framework, future-
directed intentions are formed prior to action and represent the
product of deliberation whether or not to act in a certain way.
An example is a future-directed intention to leave for Boston
in April that has been formed in January (Bratman, 1987). In
contrast, present-directed intentions inherit plans from future-
directed intentions, and implement them in a current situation of
action. Thus, if one has a future-directed intention to go to Boston
in April, a present-directed intention may be to take a particular
route that day and turn while driving to the airport, whereby the
agent advances to complete his global plan. According to Bratman
(1987), these two types of intentions are formed based on one’s
desires and beliefs as to whether the action in question is in some
way beneficial and necessary to the conscious agent.
In a more recent philosophical paper, Pacherie (2006) adopted
this terminology, referring to present- and future-directed inten-
tions as P- and F-intentions, respectively. We will use these abbre-
viations from here on, also in cases where we do not refer to the
specific theories by Pacherie (e.g., parts of Figure 3). In addi-
tion to these two types of intentions, Pacherie (2006) proposed
a third category, the so-called motor-, or M-intentions, which
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FIGURE 3 | (A) Schematic representation of sequential (A) vs. hierarchical
(B) vs. (C) mixed models of intention organization in time. Three different
scenarios are depicted for the case of a threefold intention concept, roughly
corresponding to the F-, P-, and M- intentions proposed by Pacherie (2006).
The durations of F-, P-, and M-intentions are depicted by colored bars. A
mixture of hierarchical and sequential relations is shown in (C). Which of
these different scenarios is true in a given situation would have important
consequences for attempts to decode intentions; for example, the
detection of an F-intention would rule out the simultaneous presence of the
corresponding P- and M-intentions in the purely sequential (A) but not in
the hierarchical (B) model. Note that Pacherie’s concept favors (C),
particularly in her recent work (Pacherie, 2008).
inherit goals from present-directed intentions and initiate a motor
program satisfying the spatial and temporal demands for action
realization (Pacherie, 2006). One main reason for introducing
this additional category was the consideration that, whereas both
P- and F-intentions are subject to strong rationality constraints
(Bratman, 1987), not all voluntary actions require deliberation.
Examples are such automated, routine actions as a smoker reach-
ing for a pack of cigarettes and realizing that she is doing it already
in the process of reaching (Pacherie, 2006), or a person who
unlocks his office door by mere habit of doing so every morning
(Mele, 2007).
The F-, P-, and M-intentions have distinct functional roles.
Based on Bratman’s account of F-intentions (1987), Pacherie
(2006, p. 3) assumes that F-intentions serve as “terminators of
practical reasoning about ends, prompters of practical reasoning
about means and plans, and intra- and interpersonal coordina-
tors.” The conscious P-intentions ensure “higher-level guidance
and monitoring,” whereas “lower-level guiding and monitoring
functions should properly be assigned to M-intentions” (Pacherie,
2006, p. 5). But what is the exact temporal organization of
intentions – is it hierarchical, or do intentions unfold sequentially?
A sequential model of intentions (illustrated in Figure 3A)
would assume that the F-, P-, and M- intentions precede each other,
and one type of intention stops once it has passed its goal onto the
next type which directly follows. A hierarchical model (Figure 3B),
though, would assume that all three types of intentions overlap in
time and govern one another in synchrony.
Concerning F-intentions, Pacherie (2006, p. 4) states that they
are “in principle detachable from the agent’s current situation
and [are] indeed commonly detached from it,” and that “insofar
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as they are temporally separated from the action, [F-intentions]
make no direct contribution to the experience of acting”(Pacherie,
2006, p. 14). In contrast, “P-intentions and M-intentions are both
simultaneous with the action that they guide” (Pacherie, 2006, p.
14). While these views were still at least to some extent consis-
tent both with models B and C (Figure 3), in her more recent
work, Pacherie (2008) sides more clearly in favor of a mixed
sequential-hierarchical model (Figure 3C), in which F-intentions
occur before P- and M-, and the latter two types of intentions take
place simultaneously.
The temporal model of intentions we inferred based on work by
Pacherie (2006); Figure 3C), as well as the other two models (A and
B in Figure 3), may be a useful reference to interpret observations
of action- and intention-related neural activity at different tempo-
ral scales. Furthermore, these temporal models of intentions may
entail important consequences for attempts to decode intentions.
For example, the detection of an F-intention would rule out the
simultaneous presence of the corresponding P- and M-intentions
in the purely sequential but not in the hierarchical model. The
decoding problems for BMI devices will differ accordingly.
If our experience of acting is directly governed by P- and M-,
but not by F-intentions (Pacherie, 2006), it seems plausible that
the neural correlates of F-intentions could considerably differ from
that of both P- and M-intentions. Future-oriented intentions in
neuroimaging studies have been mostly investigated in the con-
text of prospective memory (Burgess et al., 2001; den Ouden et al.,
2005; Simons et al., 2006; Eschen et al., 2007; Poppenk et al., 2010;
Gilbert, 2011; Hashimoto et al., 2011; Okuda et al., 2011; Benoit
et al., 2012; Gilbert et al., 2012; Momennejad and Haynes, 2012),
and action intentions in a current situation of action have also
been the focus of recent research (Cunnington et al., 2006; Galli-
van et al., 2011a,b), revealing partially overlapping neural effects. A
contrastive investigation into these two paradigmatic frameworks
in the literature may be of interest in future studies including
meta-analyses, and can be expected to reveal a topographically
differential distribution of neural effects related to future- vs.
present-directed intentions.
The idea that F-intentions are indeed formed prior to P-
intentions, and do not directly contribute to the experience of
action (Pacherie, 2006), may have important implications in the
context of BMI. As the term implies, F-intentions deal with
prospective plans (Bratman, 1987; Pacherie, 2006), so they may be
used as possible coordinators for the fine-tuning of an intention
decoder. Knowledge of the global plan of an intention is crucial
for understanding action orientation as a whole (Bara et al., 2011).
F-intentions could thus serve to improve the accuracy of a BMI,
and ensure goal-oriented guidance of BMI-mediated action.
To differentiate the consciously experienced P-intentions from
M-intentions, which are not subject to rationality constraints
(Pacherie, 2006), is also essential for safe and efficient BMI-
based restoration of motor functions. According to Pacherie
(2006), p. 9), when M-intentions occur without P-intentions,
they initiate “a competition among motor programs, with the
program showing the strongest activation being triggered,” such
as in the above-mentioned example of reaching for a pack
of cigarettes (Pacherie, 2006), possibly even when smoking is
prohibited. BMI-based realization of M-intentions that do not
inherit their goal from a P-intention may be, in some cases,
dangerous, and in conflict with a higher-level “no-intention”
(see below). On the other hand, unconscious intentions may
play an important role in performance of automatic actions
when no time for deliberation is available, e.g., when dri-
ving a car. Thus, there seems to be no general solution as
to which cases of “isolated” M-intentions should be executed.
Future research can be expected to shed more light on this
issue.
Philosophical accounts may provide further theoretical ground
for BMI research in their distinction between intentions to per-
form and intentions not to perform an action (Harman, 1986;
Bratman, 1987; Setiya, 2011). For the sake of brevity, we sug-
gest the terms yes- vs. no-intentions. Confusing these phenomena
would severely compromise the safety of a BMI device. Inten-
tional inhibition, which may be considered as a no-intention, has
been investigated in human neuroscience (Brass and Haggard,
2007, 2008; Kühn and Brass, 2009; Kühn et al., 2009), identify-
ing responses in the dorsal fronto-medial cortex distinct from
areas implicated in what we refer to as yes-intentions (Brass and
Haggard, 2007; Kühn et al., 2009). These findings may provide
valuable information for emergent BMI technology, particularly
to accurately interpret intended action vs. intended restraint.
Another distinction relevant to BMI is that between direct
and oblique (i.e., indirect) intentions, as proposed by the Eng-
lish philosopher Jeremy Bentham in the late eighteenth century
(1781, repr. 2000). Bentham (1781, p. 70) explains this distinction
through a discrete relation between will, actions and consequences:
“A consequence [. . .] may be said to be directly or lineally
intentional, when the prospect of producing it constituted
one of the links in the chain of causes by which the person
was determined to do the act. It may be said to be obliquely
or collaterally intentional, when although the consequence
was in contemplation, and appeared likely to ensue in case of
the acts being performed, yet the prospect of producing such
consequence did not constitute a link in the aforesaid chain.”
Bentham (1781, p. 71) exemplifies his account of direct and
oblique intentions departing from a historical case of William II,
king of England being deadly wounded by the nobleman Walter
Tyrrel during a hunt. The circumstances of this incident remained
unclear. According to Bentham, there are several possible ways to
evaluate the intentionality of Sir Tyrrel’s actions. One imaginable
scenario is that the king is riding close to a stag, and Sir Tyrrel
shoots his arrow with the aim to kill the stag; he is convinced that
the shot is not dangerous to the king. The killing in this case occurs
by accident and Bentham classifies it as unintentional. A second
possibility is that Sir Tyrrel aims to kill the stag and shoots at it,
although he is aware that the shot is as likely to kill the king as the
stag. If Sir Tyrrel’s shot kills the king in this scenario, his actions
can be regarded as obliquely intentional. A third possibility is that
Sir Tyrrel hates the king and shoots with no other aim than to kill
him. In this latter case, Sir Tyrrel’s actions classify as directly inten-
tional. Thus, direct and oblique intentions differ as to whether the
outcome of the action is actively sought-after (direct intentions)
or a foreseeable “side effect” (oblique intentions).
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Initially, this classification was developed to evaluate the degree
of responsibility for harmful actions in the legal context. How-
ever, we believe that the distinction between direct and oblique
intentions may be also of relevance to the emerging field of BMI.
Imagine a person with a BMI-controlled prosthetic arm is having
breakfast, and moves to reach a piece of bread, just behind his cup
of coffee. The person aims to reach the bread (direct intention)
and not to touch or topple the cup of coffee, although he under-
stands that these consequences may occur (oblique intention). It
is important that a BMI relying on inference of intentions does
not confuse direct with oblique intentions, and gives priority to
the execution of the former, to perform its user’s effective wishes.
To our knowledge, this direct vs. oblique distinction has not been
investigated in cognitive neuroscience, and it is currently unclear
which neural substrates support these different kinds of intentions.
Another important secernment is between what we call mere
urges and action intentions. A review of the existing literature dis-
tinguishing intentions, urges, and desires, however, is beyond the
scope of the present article (for literature on these distinctions, see
Johnston, 2001; Mele, 2007). An urge may be phenomenologically
described as a strong impulse toward an action. Urges are typically
stimulus-evoked, such as an urge to scratch evoked by an itch or an
urge to cry by a sad situation or thought. Urges may be delineated
from desires in that desires have an evaluative element, i.e., the
object of the desire is “desirable” and “good” in some way, while
urges lack this (Scanlon, 1998, 2008). Within neuroscience, the
neural underpinnings of urges have been, until now, most exten-
sively investigated in the specific context of drug craving (Maas
et al., 1998; Childress et al., 1999) and in electrical stimulation
studies (Fried et al., 1991).
If the driving force of an urge becomes overwhelming, it may
result in an “urged action” – even against one’s intentions. How-
ever, it is a fundamentally important aspect of human behavior
that urges can be controlled, and blocked if necessary. Here, we
refer to an urge without any associated intention to perform an
action as a mere urge – in contrast to an urge toward an action that
is actually intended (following a similar idea as Pockett and Miller
(2007), who distinguish a mere urge from an actual decision).
A BMI should likewise distinguish mere urges from action
intentions. The relevance of this distinction becomes clear from
the examples that follow. Imagine that a person with a BMI-
controlled bionic arm becomes as angry at a rude conversation
partner as to experience aggressive urges, such as to punch him for
the offense. Punching the offender, however, does not correspond
to the person’s actual intentions. In this and similar cases, it is
vitally important that the BMI device does not translate the mere
urge into motor performance.
Another likely situation is that a person with a BMI-controlled
arm is bitten by a mosquito and experiences an urge to scratch the
bite. The person is aware that to scratch may further hurt the skin
and make the itch even worse, so he decides to refrain from scratch-
ing. To prevent the execution of such unintended, and potentially
dangerous movements, it will be necessary for the BMI to keep
mere urges and intentions apart.
Whether the action is other- or agent-directed, an important
question regarding misinterpretation of mere urges and intentions
by BMI technology is: If someone is hurt in such a scenario, is the
user responsible, or the manufacturer of the device? It seems plau-
sible that a mere urge as defined above is not morally significant,
and that a BMI application must be able to distinguish it from an
action intention.
CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK
Intention is often treated as a unitary concept in neuroscientific
research (Brass and Haggard, 2008). Philosophy may help to dis-
cern types of intentions, and give a more differential account.
Studies of intentions in neuroscience that have explicitly used
philosophically-informed concepts are however rare at present. As
a notable exception, Bara et al. (2011) investigated, using fMRI,
several types of future intentions, namely, private, prospective
social, and communicative intentions, incorporating classifica-
tions proposed by Searle (1983), Bratman (1987), Pacherie and
Haggard (2010), as well as by Tomasello (2008). Bara et al. (2011)
found that all of these intention types were associated with activa-
tion in the right temporo-parietal junction and the precuneus; the
activity in the left temporo-parietal junction and the medial PFC,
however, was specifically observed in relation to prospective social
intentions.
In addition to these first steps toward incorporating intention
concepts from philosophy into basic neuroscience (Bara et al.,
2011), philosophical accounts may contribute to the development
of BMIs based on cognitive control signals, as has been argued
above. Examples in the previous section illustrate how a better
understanding of temporal properties of intentions is important
for safe and efficient BMI performance. Together, the reviewed lit-
erature strongly suggests that it would be particularly important
to study the neural basis of intentions (i) at different temporal
scales (Searle, 1983; Brand, 1984; Bratman, 1987; Pacherie, 2006)
and (ii) taking into account the issue of hierarchical vs. sequential
organization of intentions in time (Pacherie, 2006, 2008).
Further research to improve BMI may also benefit from under-
standing qualitative differences between various types of inten-
tions that have been proposed in philosophy, including yes- vs.
no-intentions (Harman, 1986; Bratman, 1987; Setiya, 2011), and
direct vs. oblique intentions (Bentham, 1781). Only a few neuro-
scientific studies so far have investigated intentional inhibition of
actions (Brass and Haggard, 2007, 2008; Kühn and Brass, 2009),
which is apparently analogous to a no-intention, and of yet we
are not aware of any study dedicated to the direct vs. oblique
distinction.
The temporal and semantic components of intention seem to
be strongly related, as the degree of content abstraction is generally
higher in future- compared to present-directed intentions (Searle,
1983; Mele, 1989; Pacherie, 2006). Nevertheless, it is also imagin-
able that intentions directed at the same time in the future may still
vary with respect to their level of abstraction. For instance,one may
intend to go on a holiday next summer, or one may intend to go on
a holiday to the same nice hotel in Ronda next summer. Conversely,
intentions with different temporal targets may exhibit a higher
degree of content similarity relative to other intentions with the
same time to action execution. Content abstraction may hence be
important to include into further empirical research on intention
dynamics as an additional, at least partially independent factor.
Insights from such investigations may be useful to determine
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the exact onset of an intended action in BMI-based movement
restoration.
Alongside philosophical intention taxonomies, conceptual
input from psychology and cognitive science may be of value.
For instance, a conceptual framework incorporating the “what,”
“when,” and “whether” components of intentional action has been
proposed (Brass and Haggard, 2008) and neuroscientifically inves-
tigated (Brass and Haggard, 2007; Mueller et al., 2007; Krieghoff
et al., 2009; Kühn and Brass, 2009; Kühn et al., 2009; Obhi et al.,
2009; Hoffstaedter et al., 2012; Momennejad and Haynes, 2012).
Further hallmark questions to be addressed in future interdisci-
plinary research are: (i) Can philosophical intention taxonomies
be used as direct input for BMI studies, or do they first need to
be operationalized to be applicable to neuronal data? (ii) What
are the correspondences and differences between philosophical
and psychological concepts of human intent? In addressing these
questions, not only may neuroscience and BMI research benefit
from cooperation with philosophy, but also vice versa: insights into
the biological plausibility of different aspects and types of inten-
tions proposed in the philosophy of mind may provide valuable
empirical feedback, thereby closing the loop from neuroscience to
philosophy.
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